Fully interpreted, Lewis's dynamic systems modeling of emotion encompasses psychological-adaptation thinking and individual and group differences in normal and abnormal behavior. It weakens the categorical perspective in evolutionary psychology and the clinical sciences; and suggests continuity between “normal” or “abnormal” behavior in whatever way this is self and culturally constituted, although culture/linguistic factors and selfhood are neglected. Application of a dynamic systems model could improve formulation of clinical problems.

Ethnomedicine is the field that analyzes medical traditions comparatively. An ethnomedical approach is used in the essay to analyze the topic of medical ethics. General properties of medical ethics as realized in different societies are outlined. These pertain to the healer's relations with clients, with other healers, and with the group or society. The conditions of medical practice and the influence of social and political factors that affect them are discussed in relation to medical ethical questions. Unique developments of contemporary (...) medical science that affect and condition practice and raise new ethical questions are examined in light of ethnomedical generalizations. The essay aims to clarify the cultural bases of medicine generally and ethical aspects of medical practice and care more specifically. (shrink)

Arbib offers a comprehensive, elegant formulation of brain/language evolution; with significant implications for social as well as biological sciences. Important psychological antecedents and later correlates are presupposed; their conceptual enrichment through protosign and protospeech is abbreviated in favor of practical communication. What culture “is” and whether protosign and protospeech involve a protoculture are not considered. Arbib also avoids dealing with the question of evolution of mind, consciousness, and self.

In the case of religion, explanations based on emotion should be privileged over those based on “cold” cognition. The origins of religious beliefs are as critical to understanding religion as are the group phenomena which sustain them. In addition, religion's relationship to the growth of knowledge is neglected by the target authors. The balance between the costs and benefits of religion will vary depending upon the phase of an individual society's cultural evolution.

Summary and ConclusionsThis paper presents the argument that the character of illness in psychiatry requires embracing phenomena which falls outside the area of concern of basic biologic sciences. The argument is developed by introducing the idea of a “theory of illness,” a cultural trait of a society, and by examining features of our biomedical theory of illness. The disease “depression” is then examined in terms of this theory. A basic point made is that an appraisal of any medical system involves (...) dealing with social factors and cultural conventions. Another one is that the effective and prudent application of biomedical knowledge requires dealing with neurobiologic as well as social and cultural factors that in a complementary fashion provide understanding about the organization and meaning of behavior. An emphasis on the organization and meaning of behavior, with the aim of uncovering illness conditions which can be effectively controlled, is and very likely will continue to be a central concern of psychiatry. (shrink)

Fully interpreted, Lewis's dynamic systems modeling of emotion encompasses psychological-adaptation thinking and individual and group differences in normal and abnormal behavior. It weakens the categorical perspective in evolutionary psychology and the clinical sciences; and suggests continuity between or behavior in whatever way this is self and culturally constituted, although culture/linguistic factors and selfhood are neglected. Application of a dynamic systems model could improve formulation of clinical problems.

Arbib offers a comprehensive, elegant formulation of brain/language evolution; with significant implications for social as well as biological sciences. Important psychological antecedents and later correlates are presupposed; their conceptual enrichment through protosign and protospeech is abbreviated in favor of practical communication. What culture and whether protosign and protospeech involve a protoculture are not considered. Arbib also avoids dealing with the question of evolution of mind, consciousness, and self.

In the case of religion, explanations based on emotion should be privileged over those based on cognition. The origins of religious beliefs are as critical to understanding religion as are the group phenomena which sustain them. In addition, religion's relationship to the growth of knowledge is neglected by the target authors. The balance between the costs and benefits of religion will vary depending upon the phase of an individual society's cultural evolution.

Disease represents a principal tentacle of natural selection and a staple theme of evolutionary medicine. However, it is through a small portal of entry and a very long lineage that disease as sickness entered behavioural spaces and human consciousness. This has a long evolutionary history. Anyone interested in the origins of medicine and psychiatry as social institution has to start with analysis of how mind and body were conceptualised and played out behaviourally following the pongid/hominin split and thereafter. The early (...) evolution of medicine provides a template for clarifying elemental characteristics of mind and minding. Sickness and healing in chimpanzees represents an early manifestation of (ethno) medicine, termed a behavioural tradition, which is found played out in routines of helping, caring, and healing as well as other social behaviours. Chimpanzees seem to know they are sick since they resort to self-medication when exhibiting signs and symptoms of disease. Also, they help those exhibiting physical and cognitive disability. Among hominins, awareness of consequences and implications of sickness and coping with them represented an important feature of human consciousness and a major factor in the origins of vaunted human abilities involving language, cognition, and culture as we know them. A philosophical examination of the early evolution of sickness and healing provides a window into an understanding of evolving human capacities such as self-awareness, awareness and implications of suffering, theory of mind, altruism, conceptual grasp of sickness and healing and morality. (shrink)

Pain is a biological and subjective phenomenon. Clear understanding of its features is essential. Wierzbicka’s analysis accomplishes this. This comment discusses the relevance of her approach for the study of early evolution of medicine. The comment has six parts: (a) Wierzbicka’s theory and method; (b) its application to pain; (c) relevance of pain for the study of ethnomedicine, the cultural understanding of sickness and healing; (d) significance of natural semantic metalanguage (NSM) for understanding the evolution of human thought and behavior; (...) (e) relevance of NSM for studying biological and cultural evolution of early medicine; and (f) summary and conclusion. (shrink)

Erdelyi grants emotional and cognitive qualities that can modulate consciousness and probably overlap with what is typically attributed to Such a broad appellation of repression explains virtually all behavior and lacks specificity. Repression and attention elucidate behavior in different clinical, cognitive, and cultural contexts. Refining these influences, we identify a few lacunae in Erdelyi's account.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 3.2 (1996) 139-142 Concurrent Contents: Recent and Classic References at the Interface of Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology Articles Abramowitz, S., C. Abramowitz, C. Jackson et al. 1973. The politics of clinical judgment. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology 41: 385-391.Audi, R. N. 1972. Psychoanalytic explanation and the concept of rational action. The Monist 56: 444- 464.Barondess, J. A. 1979. Disease and illness--a crucial distinction. American (...) Journal of Medicine 66: 375-376.Barrett, R. J. 1988. Interpretations of schizophrenia. Culture, Medicine and Psychiatry 12: 357-388.Bechtel, W. 1993. The case for connectionism. Philosophical Studies 7: 119-154.Belzen, J. A. 1995. The impact of phenomenology on classical psychiatry: Rümke's position between Jaspers and Kraepelin. History of Psychiatry 6: 349-385.Benda, C. E. 1967. Neuroses of conscience. Journal of Existentialism 7: 425-442.Binns, P. 1995. Commentary on "Contentless consciousness." Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2: 61-63.Blankenburg, W. 1980. Phenomenology and psychopathology. Journal of Phenomenological Psychology 11: 50-78.Bloomfield, T. M. 1979. Psychoanalysis: A human science? Journal for the Theory of Social Behavior 9: 271-287.Blumenfeld, D. 1972. Free action and unconscious motivation. The Monist 56: 426-443.Boudreaux, G. 1977. Freud on the nature of unconscious mental processes. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 7: 1-32.Bracken, P. J. 1995. Beyond liberation: Michael Foucault and the notion of a critical psychiatry. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2, no. 1: 1-13.Brazier, M. 1995. Commentary on "Who should be committable?." Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2, no. 1: 49-50.Bursztajn, J., and A. Brodsky. 1995. Authenticity and autonomy in the managed-care era: Forensic psychiatric perspectives. Journal of Clinical Ethics 5, no. 3: 237-242.Byrnes, J. F. 1979. Suggestions on writing the history of psychological data. History and Theory 16: 297-305.Campbell, E. J., J. G. Scadding, and R. J. Roberts. 1979. The concept of disease. British Medical Journal 2: 757-762.Carveth, D. 1988. In reply to Eagle's reply on "The epistemological foundations of psychoanalysis." Philosophy of the Social Sciences 18: 377-378.Chadwick, R. F. 1995. Commentary on "Karl Jaspers and Edmund Husserl." Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2, no. 1: 83-84.Christiansen, B. 1964. The scientific status of psychoanalytic clinical evidence (III). Inquiry 7: 47-79.Davis, M. 1987. Realistic utilitarianism and the social conditions of cognitive psychotherapy. Social Theory & Practice 13: 237-259.Dega, W., et al. 1978. Ethics and mental health: Discussion. Dialectics and Humanism 5: 219-235.Dingle, H. 1949. The logical status of psycho-analysis. Analysis 9: 63-66.Dupeau, J. 1977. Freud and degeneracy. Diogenes Spring: 43-64.Eagle, M. 1988. A reply to Carveth's "The epistemological foundations of psychoanalysis. Philosophy of the Social Sciences 18: 371-375.Elevitch, B. 1974-75. Reasons, motives and psychoanalysis. Philosophical Forum (Boston) 6: 143- 162.Elliot, P. 1995. Policies, identity, and social change: Contested grounds in psychoanalytic feminism. Hypatia 10: 41-55.Fabrega Jr, H. 1980. The position of psychiatric illness in biomedical theory: A cultural analysis. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 5: 145-168.Fisk, G. 1993. Accreditation of psychotherapists. British Journal of Hospital Medicine 50: 437-438.Flynn, B. G. 1985. Reading Habermas reading Freud. Human Studies 8: 57-76.Forrow, L., R. M. Arnold, and J. Frader. 1991. Teaching clinical ethics in the residency years--preparing competent professionals. Journal of Medicine and Philosophy 16: 93-112.Friedman, M. 1982. Philosophical anthropology and psychotherapy. Philosophical Context 12: 9-19.Galdston, I. 1969. The ontologic foundations of morality. Existential Psychiatry 7: 69-75.Gardner, S. 1995a. Commentary on "Irrationality and the dynamic unconscious." Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2, no. 2: 175-176.Gardner, S. 1995b. Psychoanalysis, science, and commonsense. Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology 2, no. 2: 93-113.Handelsman, M. M. et al. 1995. Does legally mandated consent to psychotherapy ensure ethical appropriateness? The Colorado experience. Ethics and Behavior 5, no. 2: 119-129.Hanlon, M. D. 1977. Commentary on Dunham's "Psychiatry, Sociology and Civil Liberties." Values and Ethics in Health Care 2: 275-278.Heaton, J. M. 1972. Insight in... (shrink)

entry for the Entry for the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, 2007.

Resumen: En Le courage de la vérité, justo antes del análisis en torno de la filosofía cínica, se hace referencia a una serie de textos que han abordado en alguna medida la cuestión del influjo del cinismo helenístico más allá de los márgenes de la Antigüedad. El único de los textos mencionados que no es alemán y que tiene como autor a alguien que pertenece al escenario intelectual de Foucault es Cynisme et passion de André Glucksmann, trabajo que ha sido (...) obviado por las diferentes investigaciones en torno a la filosofía cínica y por los estudios sobre la “vuelta” foucaultiana a los griegos. En el presente ensayo no procuraremos apenas dejar en evidencia la originalidad y pertinencia de la concepción glucksmanniana del cinismo, sino, además, mostraremos los elementos en los que se descubre un paralelismo entre dicha concepción y lo sostenido por Foucault en el último de sus seminarios impartidos en el Collège.: In Le courage de la vérité, just prior to his analysis of Cynicism, Foucault refers to a series of texts that have addressed, to some extent, the influence of Ancient Cynicism beyond the margins of ancient times. Among the texts mentioned, there is only one that is not German, whose author belongs to Foucault’s intellectual environment: André Glucksmann’s Cynisme et passion. This work has been ignored by both different pieces of research on Cynicism, and the studies regarding Foucault’s “return” to the Greeks. The present article will not merely highlight the originality and relevance of Glucksmann’s conception of Cynicism, but it will also reveal the elements in which parallelisms can be found between such conception and what Foucault claims in his last course at the Collège de France. (shrink)

French naturalists at the Muséum Nationale d’Histoire Naturelle in Paris in the early nineteenth century recognized that their individual and collective successes were intimately linked to questions of power over specimens. France’s strength abroad affected the growth of the museum’s collections. At the museum, preserving, naming, classifying, displaying, interpreting, and otherwise deploying specimens went hand in hand with promoting scientific theories, advancing scientific careers, and instructing the public. The control of specimens, both literally and figuratively, was the museum’s ongoing concern. (...) The leopard in this essay’s title, a live specimen confiscated from the streets of Paris in 1793, serves here to represent the tensions created in an existing order of things by the introduction of a potentially disruptive agent. The essay explores the life of the museum and the interrelations among its naturalists, the special challenges created by the establishment of a menagerie, and the histories of particular specimens and ideas. (shrink)

Although Kant introduced the analytic/synthetic distinction, and although this distinction has been immensely influential, very few philosophers find Kant’s formulation of the distinction acceptable. Quine, for example, rejects Kant’s characterization of analyticity on the grounds that “it appeals to a notion of containment which is left at a metaphorical level.” This criticism is, I believe, unwarranted, for, although Kant is not as clear about the notion of conceptual containment as one would like, in both the Critique of Pure Reason and (...) the Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics he offers intentional characterizations of this notion which, I hope to show, can be given a clear and precise formulation. Moreover, I shall argue that the notion of conceptual containment can be used to provide both an adequate characterization of analyticity and a nonlinguistic solution to the paradox of analysis. (shrink)

Constructive engagement in international business practice is defined as purpose-driven behavior in which economic contributions by the foreign investor also advance social progress in the host country. This paper distinguishes between amoral and moral social agency, and proposes a model of principled constructive engagement that describes a principled constructive engagement regime enacted in a disciplined, morally-directed manner.

Some people have found my distinction between meaning and significance useful. In the following revision of that distinction, I hope to improve its accuracy and perhaps, therefore, its utility as well. My impulse for making the revision has been my realization, very gradually achieved, that meaning is not simply an affair of consciousness and unconsciousness. In 1967, in Validity in Interpretation, I roundly asserted that “there is no magic land of meanings outside human consciousness.” 1 That assertion would be true (...) if, godlike, we could oversee the whole of human consciousness, past, present, and future. But we language users, being limited creatures, intend our verbal meanings to go beyond what we can pay attention to at any moment. We intend our meanings to transcend our momentary limitations of attention and knowledge. Hence there is a land of meanings beyond past and present human consciousness—the land of the future. What I should have said originally is that there is no magic lance of meanings beyond the whole extent of human consciousness, past, present, and future. This correction of my original statements leads to a deepening of the concept of meaning.In 1960 I first proposed the analytical distinction between two aspects of textual interpretation. One of them, meaning, was fixed and immutable; the other, significance, was open to change.2 I acknowledged that significance, changeable or not, is the more valuable object of interpretation, because it typically embraces the present use of texts, and present use is present value. But I argued that, in academic criticism, the significance and use of a text ought to be rooted in its fixed meaning, since otherwise criticism would lack a stable object of inquiry and would merely float on tides of preference. The claim that one reader’s opinion is as valid as another’s would then be right, despite any indignant protest to the contrary. I did not wish to dissuade people from floating on the tides of preference if that was what they wished to do. I intended to provide a firm justification for those who wished to pursue historical scholarship. 3 I also assumed that even those who did not pursue historical scholarship might sometimes wish to exploit the possibility of historically fixed meaning. In my experience, even antiauthorial theorists sometimes with to regard their own texts as having a historically fixed meaning and will complain if someone misunderstands that meaning. 1. E. D. Hirsch, Jr., Validity in Interpretation, p. 4.2. See my “Objective Interpretation,” PMLA 75 : 463-79.3. See, for instance, W. K. Wimsatt, Jr., and Monroe C. Beardsley, “The Intentional Fallacy,” in Wimsatt, The Verbal Icon: Studies in the Meaning of Poetry, which ends:We submit that this is the true and objective way of criticism, as contrasted to what the very uncertainty of exegesis might tempt a second kind of critic to undertake: the way of biographical or genetic inquiry …. Our point is that such an answer to such an inquiry would have nothing to do with the poem “Prufrock”; it would not be a critical inquiry. Critical inquiries, unlike bets, are not settled in this way. Critical inquiries are not settled by consulting the oracle. [P. 18] E. D. Hirsch, Jr., professor of English at the University of Virginia, is the author of numerous works, including Validity in Interpretation and The Aims of Interpretation. His previous contributions to Critical Inquiry are “Against Interpretation?”, “The Politics of Theories of Interpretation, and “Stylistics and Synonymity”. (shrink)

Even though management scholars have offered several views on the process of corporate sustainability, these efforts have focused mainly on the technical aspects of sustainability while omitting the fundamental role played by individual moral competences. Therefore, previous work offers an incomplete and somewhat reductionist view of corporate sustainability. In this article, we develop a holistic framework of corporate sustainability in which both the moral and technical aspects of sustainability are considered. We do so by integrating the ethical, normative perspective of (...) the Catholic social teaching with the competitive view of the natural resource-based view. This framework highlights the importance of CST principles and ideas in developing executive moral competences such as moral sensitivity and awareness, and moral cognition and motivation. Moral competences, in turn, influence the organizational selection of environmental strategies, giving leaders the intrinsic motivation to promote both a longer-term stance on corporate sustainability efforts and a relentless search for greener business models. Such strategies move the firm closer towards achieving environmental sustainability. Hence, by bridging the individual, normative-ethical with the organizational, implementational levels of corporate sustainability, our framework provides a more realistic, coherent, and complete perspective on the complex process of achieving corporate sustainability. (shrink)